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Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of
Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty
Joel R. Levine
Based on the premises that manufacturers should be held re-
sponsible for the goods they produce and that they can best bear
the cost of injuries from these goods, courts have been compen-
sating plaintiffs for product-caused injuries at an ever-increasing
rate. Under the rubric of "warranty," the doctrine of strict
liability has been relentlessly applied. Frequently, however,
sufficient inquiry has not been made into the conduct of the
person claiming damages. This Article will examine several
notable cases in which the courts have failed to examine care-
fully the buyer's conduct in order to illustrate the problem;
discuss the types of buyer conduct which have been held to
be defenses in warranty; consider the arguments against the
use of contributory negligence as a defense in warranty; dis-
cuss those cases which utilize the buyer's contributory negli-
gence in some manner as a defense in warranty; and suggest a
comparative fault standard for considering the buyer's conduct
in products liability cases.
I. THE BASIS OF RECOVERY IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In most products liability cases the plaintiff alleges two
grounds of action: negligence and breach of warranty. Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Company" firmly established manufac-
turer's liability for negligence in making a product, even to re-
mote consumers with whom he had no direct contractual rela-
tionship. Products liability law has evolved considerably be-
yond MacPherson, and the current tendency in negligence is
simply to require reasonable care by manufacturers for all their
products. 2 Proof of negligence has been made easier by an in-
creasing use of res ipsa loquitur.3
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 11l N.E. 1050 (1916) (Cardozo, J.).
2. Smith v. Acto Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 383, 94 N.W.2d 697, 704
(1959) (test of liability is not whether the particular product is inher-
ently dangerous but whether the manufacturer employed the care
which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent person in the shoes
of the manufacturer).
3. Ryan v. Zweck-Wallenberg Co., 266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W.2d 226
(1954); cf. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191
N.E.2d 81 (1963) (warranty) (dissent speaks of the ease "with which
lack of due care can be brought to light through devices such as res
ipsa loquitur." 12 N.Y.2d at 440 n.2, 181 N.E. at 85 n.2).
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Most products liability cases, however, have been decided on
a breach of warranty theory. Since breach of warranty is a
form of absolute liability obviating the necessity of proving neg-
ligence,4 it occupies a preferred position as a basis for estab-
lishing liability for product-caused injury.5 A warranty may be
defined as a representation by a seller concerning the charac-
ter and quality of his goods by which he undertakes to be respon-
sible for resulting damages if the goods are in a condition other
than that represented.6 In an action for breach of warranty
7
the buyer must prove existence of the warranty,s breach of the
warranty,9 reliance on the warranty, 0 loss or injury resulting
from the breach, and breach of the warranty as the proximate
cause of the loss sustained.'1
Warranties may be express' 2 or implied. 13  While an ex-
4. Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 431 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1967);
Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P.2d 470 (1945);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 372, 400, 161 A.2d 69,
77, 92 (1960); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla.
1966).
5. 1 R. HURSH, AMERIcAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 3:1
(1961) [hereinafter cited as HURSH].
6. Cf. Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
7. Freedman, A Brief For Products Liability Today, 15 Bus. LAw.
672, 680 (1960).
8. UNIFomv COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 13.
9. Id.; Kepling v. Schlueter Mfg. 'Co., 378 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1967);
Jacobsen v. Ford Motor Co., 427 P.2d 621 (Kan. 1967).
10. Ingalls v. Meissner, 11 Wis. 2d1 371, 105 N.W.2d 748 (1960).
However, recently this requirement has been held satisfied by bare
proof of reliance: Transamerica Leasing Corp. v. Van's Realty Co., 427
P.2d 284 (Idaho 1967); Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 157 Me. 10,
170 A.2d 160 (1961); Venie v. South Cent. Enterprises, Inc., 401 S.W.2d
495 (Mo. 1966); Kasey v. Surburban Gas Heat, 60 Wash. 2d 468, 374
P.2d 549 (1962) (act of purchase and proper use of product sufficient).
See 1 L. FRUJMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.03 [2] (1965
Supp.) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN].
11. Borowicz v. Chicago Mastic Co., 367 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1966);
Natale v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 282, 182 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1959);
cf. Gonzalez v. Derrington, 56 Cal. 2d :130, 363 P.2d 1, 14 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1961).
12. Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(1). See also UNIFORM SALEs ACT
§ 12.
13. The implied warranty of quality embraces both the warranty
of merchantability and the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Merchantability has been defined as "fair average quality." UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2). The implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose presupposes that the seller knows the particular pur-
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press warranty requires some affirmative representation relat-
ing to the goods sold,14 implied warranties arise under certain
circumstances by operation of law irrespective of any intention
by the seller to create them. 15
The traditional doctrine that the plaintiff had to be in privity
of contract with the manufacturer to maintain an action for
breach of warranty1" has been eroded. Dean Prosser states that
the "citadel of privity" fell in 1960 when the decision in Hen-
ingsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. was announced.17  The court
in Henningsen pointed out that the concept of limiting liability
for product-caused injuries to those in privity of contract with
the manufacturer developed at a time when marketing condi-
tions were uncomplicated and products could be inspected by
the buyer. The court argued that privity concepts were not
properly applicable in a modern economy of mass marketing
where demand is created by advertising media directed at the
general public and where manufacturers are rarely in privity
of contract with the ultimate consumer.' s Finally, the court con-
cluded that since manufacturers could best control the danger
or distribute the risk of loss when injury did occur, they should
be liable to all consumers regardless of whether privity was
present.10
pose for which the purchaser bought the product and that the purchaser
relies on the seller's skill and judgment to supply him with that very
product. UNIFomV COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315. The seller is required to
supply the purchaser with a product reasonably fit for the purpose
made known to him. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App.
2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
14. HUrSH §§ 3:3, 3:36-:40.
15. Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Mitchell v.
Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 372, 161 A.2d 69, 77 (1960); Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
16. For an enumeration of cases requiring privity of contract
between plaintiff and manufacturer under the Uniform Sales Act see
cases collected in Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39, 46 (1961).
17. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MNN. L. REv. 791 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel].
18. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379,
161 A.2d 69, 80-81 (1960).
19. Id. While the Henningsen court's rejection of the privity rule
may merely have been dicta, most jurisdictions have followed the
court's reasoning and held that privity of contract is no longer a sine
qua non for a manufacturer's liability in warranty. See Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel 794-98. But see, e.g., Blum v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 268 F. Supp. 906 (D. Md. 1965); Cruz v. Ansul Chemical Co., 399
S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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In products liability cases, it is usually an implied warranty
which has allegedly been breached. When a manufacturer puts
his product on the market, he arguably represents that it is safe.
The consumer should be entitled to rely on this implied rep-
resentation. The manufacturer, by advertising his product in
various modern communications media, creates a demand for it
and further induces a belief that it is suitable for safe human
use. This amounts to an implied warranty which is breached
if the product is in fact defective and causes injury.
The imposition of strict liability on the manufacturer has
also been justified on other grounds not directly related to war-
ranty. The manufacturer is the one who creates the risk and
puts it on the market where the consumer can come into contact
with it. 20 He reaps the profits from the product's sale. There-
fore, arguably, he should be liable for any losses suffered because
of the risk he created. In addition, the manufacturer is best able
to improve the safety of his product.21 Thus, it is argued that he
should be held liable to encourage him to do so.22 Finally, the
manufacturer has been thought of as the one best able to either
bear the risk of loss from product-caused injuries or to transfer
any loss to society as a whole. He can spread the risk of loss by
raising the prices on all of his goods to cover the cost of his lia-
bility for injuries caused by them.2 - While each of these argu-
20. The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect them-
selves.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1962).
21. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser,
Strict Liability]; Note, The Cutler Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case Study
of Manufacturers' Liability Without Fault in Tort & Warranty, 65
YALE L.J. 262, 272 (1955) (criticizing this position); 13 STAN. L. REV.
645 (1961) (criticizing this position).
22. However, a significant increase in care is likely to result only
if present remedies do not demand the highest practicable standards.
13 STAN. L. REV. 645, 646 (1961). If our aim is increasingly safer
products, we do not want to force the manufacturer into a choice of
paying exorbitant premiums for all-inclusive liability insurance rather
than using his resources for research for improved safety. His choice
may well be the former if we hold him liable regardless of commendable
progress or compliance with a reasonable level of safety approved in
the industry, and if the standard to which we hold him is tech-
nologically impossible to attain.
23. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Morris, Enterprise Liability
and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J.
[Vol. 52: 627
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ments is subject to criticism, many courts have uncritically ac-
cepted them and applied them to justify the imposition of strict
liability in warranty cases.
Several courts, based on some or all of the above arguments
and based on the public interest in human safety which requires
that the supposedly helpless consumer be protected against de-
fective products, have held that a manufacturer or seller is an
insurer of his product.24 A majority of the courts, however, hold
that neither a manufacturer nor a seller is an insurer of the
product in which he deals.
24a
II. BUYER'S CONDUCT CONTRIBUTING TO INJURY AS A
DEFENSE IN WARRANTY
A. FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE BUYER'S CONDUCT IN WARRANTY:
CASE ILLUSTRATIONS
In many jurisdictions the buyer's contributory negligence is
not a defense to an action for breach of warranty.25 According
554, 583-87 (1961). Repetitive assertion of the manufacturer's risk ab-
sorbing ability is no help to the small manufacturer with increasing
costs, few assets, keen competition, and high elasticity of demand for
his product. Indeed, it is merely fortuitous when a small manufac-
turer is better able to shift losses than an individual plaintiff. Most
people can obtain low cost medical insurance, which is an effective
means of allocating losses over a large segment of society.
24. E.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Eisman, 259 Ky. 103, 81 S.W.
2d 900 (1935); Gilbert v. John Gendusa Bakery, Inc., 144 So. 2d 760
(La. App. 1962); Holt v. Mann, 294 Mass. 21, 200 N.E. 403 (1936).
24a. E.g., Arkansas Baking Co. v. Aaron, 204 Ark. 900, 166 S.W.2d
14 (1942); Ulwelling v. Crown Coach Corp., 206 Cal. App. 2d 96, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 631 (1962); Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442
(1959). A manufacturer or seller has no duty to deal in a "perfect"
product. Standard Conveyer Co. v. Scott, 221 F.2d 460 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 830 (1955). These cases involved hazards which the
buyer might easily have discovered, while the insurer cases usually in-
volved hazards which were extremely difficult for the buyer to discover
in advance. It has also been held that a manufacturer is an insurer of
his product only if it proves defective and causes injury under normal
use. Tamburello v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 206 F. Supp. 920 (D. La.
1962). Inquiry into the ease of discoverability of the risk or the ab-
normality of use of the product requires an evaluation of the buyer's
conduct which should be undertaken consciously by the trier of fact and
not obscured by a preconceived insurer concept.
25. In any event, superior risk-spreading capacity should not in
itself be a basis for liability. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of
Torts, 72 HARV. L. REv. 401, 405-09, 436-43 (1959).
The influence of risk-spreading capacity in tort decisions is
primarily in the role of what might be called an enabling or
rebuttal factor. It removes a barrier which might have pre-
vented the imposition of liability based primarily on other
grounds.
Id. at 441. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), affd,
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to this view, lack of due care by the plaintiff-buyer is imma-
terial, and the defendant's evidence bearing on this issue is ex-
cluded. Analysis of the cases in which the buyer's lack of
due care contributed to his injury reveals the deficiency of
such an approach.
Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Company26 illus-
trates the effect of the rule that contributory negligence is no
defense to an action in warranty. The plaintiff consumed part of
a bottle of Coke purchased from a coin-operated machine. She
became sick soon afterwards and claimed that her illness was
caused by a book of matches contained in the bottle. Defendant,
Coca-Cola, was not permitted to introduce evidence concerning
its care in producing and distributing its product in order to
prove that it was not at fault.27 The court reasoned that in an
action on an implied warranty, evidence showing the defend-
ant's fault or lack of fault is unnecessary, such fault being con-
clusively presumed by virtue of the defendant's position as an
insurer.
It would be nearly impossible for Coca-Cola to prove that
Mrs. Simmons or anyone else introduced the matches into the
bottle, yet the court required the defendant positively to affix
the blame on another to exculpate itself.28 The court considered
304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); Rasmus v. A.O. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp.
70 (N.D. Iowa 1958); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d
855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963); Vassalo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal.
App. 2d 11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1963); Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal.
App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962); Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957); Challis v. Hartloff, 136
Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933); Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231
Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918); Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290
Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio
St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super.
422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959); cf. Boston Woven-Hose & Rubber Co. v.
Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657 (1901); 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN §
16.01 [3]; 1 HuRsH § 3:9.
26. 181 Kan. 35, 309 P.2d 633 (1957).
27. It appears that Coca-Cola was attempting to fix the blame on
one of three classes of people: the plaintiff, the machine owner who
regularly handled the bottles, or the world at large excluding Coca-
Cola.
28. In Pulley v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 415 P.2d 635 (Wash.
1966), the plaintiff uncapped a sealed bottle and took a swallow of
the beverage. She then took a second swallow, even though she had
noticed an "odd taste" the first time. She became violently ill after
discovering a cigarette and bits of loose tobacco floating in the bottle.
The court held that the defendant could escape liability only by show-
ing who contaminated that particular bottle and that "indirect and cir-
cumstantial evidence that it was imprcbable or even impossible that
[Vol. 52: 627
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it immaterial that the bottle left Coca-Cola's plant free of any
foreign substance, thus precluding any inference that someone
else may have been responsible for the matches in the bottle. In
addition, the court stated that "allegations of contributory neg-
ligence [or] those negativing any possible carelessness on the part
of the defendants are. . . [not a] defense to an action to recover
on a breach of an implied warranty."29 This clearly precluded
consideration of any evidence that Mrs. Simmons reasonably
should have looked at the bottle. Under the rubric of strict
liability, the court completely foreclosed a showing that some-
one other than the defendant was responsible for the plaintiff's
injuries.
If Simmons merely stands for the proposition that the de-
fendant's proof of care does not as a matter of law exculpate
him from liability in warranty actions, it is a reasonable deci-
sion.30 However, if the opinion stands for the exclusion of all
evidence of defendant's care3 ' and precludes consideration of
possible fault on the part of other persons, it clearly goes too far.
For example, what if the defendant's chemical test indicates,
contrary to the evidence offered by the plaintiff, that the foreign
substance was added to the bottle about the time of purchase
and not earlier? What if there Were nine matchbooks in the
bottle which any reasonable person would have noticed, instead
of just one? Such evidence would probably be excluded! This
approach may place ultimate liability on one who is surely inno-
cent and compensate one who is surely not.
The Uniform Commercial Code, purportedly drafted in con-
formity with "the steadily developing case law,"32 permits con-
sideration of "evidence indicating that the seller exercised care
in the manufacture, processing or selection of the goods ...
relevant to the issue of whether the warranty was in fact
broken."
33
the defendants were responsible for the presence of the harmful ob-
ject" was inadmissible. Id. at 640 (emphasis added). Thus, Simmons
is certainly not a unique case.
29. 181 Kan. at 38, 309 P.2d at 635.
30. Manufacturers have no trouble showing care and preventative
measures by scientific and expert testimony. It is questionable, how-
ever, whether such proof should be omitted entirely rather than
weighed against plaintiff's proof.
31. 181 Kan. at 38, 309 P.2d at 636.
32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 ('Purpose of Changes").
33. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 13. The reader
may then ask what becomes of the doctrine of strict liability under
which it is unnecessary to prove negligence. This provision, although
affecting the negligence principle to some extent, does not negate it.
1968]
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Several cases have indicated that a manufacturer's implied
or express warranty has reference only to the product's condition
at the time it left the possession or control of the warrantor.
34
A product defective at the time of injury may not have been
defective while under the manufacturer's control. 35 Indeed, at
the time of injury the product's condition may reflect material
alterations by the purchaser."6 Nonetheless, many courts, as
in Simmons, steadfastly refuse to inquire into certain types of
purchaser conduct in breach of warranty cases.
In Kassouf v. Lee Brothers,37 the plaintiff purchased a Her-
shey bar at Lee Brothers' Market. Shortly after arriving home,
she sat down and began to read a newspaper in her lighted
dining room. While reading, she took the candy bar from a
table. Without looking at it, she opened one end of the wrapper
and slid the bar partially out from it. Using one hand she
broke off pieces and ate them. From the outset Mrs. Kassouf
noticed that the candy did not taste right, but she assumed
this was because she had not eaten all day. She had consumed
The Code carefully confines such proof to the issue of whether the war-
ranty is in fact broken. In Simmons the warranty should have been
that Coca-Cola would bottle an uncontaminated beverage and deliver
the same free from impurities to the machine operator. Coca-Cola
could not guarantee the condition of the soda as it is consumed because
of what might happen after it is delivered. Coca-Cola should be per-
mitted to show that the defect lay not" in its product as warranted
but arose in the subsequent handling of the goods. Unfortunately the
idea of strict liability serves to obliterate this distinction, and as Sim-
mons illustrates, the courts frequently do not attempt to ascertain the
precise limit of the warranty. Compare Simmons with Sharpe v. Dan-
ville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E.2d 442 (1956),
and Williams v. Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98
N.E.2d 164 (1951).
34. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Fix, 200 F.2d
529 (8th Cir. 1952); O'Donnell v. Geneva Metal Wheel Co., 183 F.2d 733
(6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 903 (1951); Tiffin v. Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co., 20 Ill. App. 2d 421, 156 N.E.2d 249, aff'd, 18 Ill. 2d 48,
162 N.E.2d 406 (1959); Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 9
Ill. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E.2d 442 (1956); Williams v. Puducah Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 343 Ill. App. 1, 98 N.E.2d 164 (1951); Jacobson v.
Ford Motor Co., 427 P.2d 621 (Kan. 1937); cf. Darling v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 171 Cal. App. 2d 713, 341 P.2d 23 (1959).
35. Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957); cf.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Independent Metal Prods. Co., 203 F.2d 838 (8th
Cir. 1953); Lynch v. International Harvester Co., 60 F.2d 223 (10th
Cir. 1932); Smolen v. Grandview Dairy, Inc., 301 N.Y. 265, 93 N.E.2d
839 (1950).
36. Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1957).
37. 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962). See Comment,
Products Liability: For the Defense-Ccntributory Fault, 33 TENN. L.
REV. 464, 470-73 (1966).
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about one-third of the candy bar before she bit into a mushy
worm. When she looked at the bar, she saw that it was covered
with worms and webbing with eggs hanging on. The condition
of the bar was corroborated by two witnesses. Mrs. Kassouf
became ill and developed chronic ulcerative colitis.
The court held that contributory negligence was not a de-
fense to a warranty action and that the jury need not consider
whether Mrs. Kassouf was using due care. The buyer need not
inspect food before purchasing or eating it because of the modern
processes of manufacturing, packaging, and merchandising food
products which make it reasonable for the buyer to assume that
it is not defective.3 8 The court added that the defendant was
held to a standard of strict liability and that it would detract
from the warranty to require plaintiff to exercise ordinary
care for her protection.39 The jury was not permitted to con-
clude that any reasonable person would look at what he eats4 °
or would stop eating a foul tasting candy bar immediately after
sampling the vile taste of worms and larvae.
Strict liability makes it unnecessary for the plaintiff to es-
tablish negligence on the part of the defendant. It should not
mean that the plaintiff's fault is immaterial. Some courts simply
state that contributory negligence is not a defense to breach of
warranty. Such a formalistic use of labels should not preclude
an examination of the buyer's behavior.41 The buyer's conduct
in contributing to and aggravating the injury militated against
complete recovery in Kassouf. Careful appraisal of the plain-
tiff's fault might well have completely barred her recovery.
Perhaps a jury would find it reasonable to eat a worm ridden
candy bar, but foreclosing such inquiry carries the day for plain-
tiff without giving the defendant a chance. An approach similar
to comparative negligence would ameliorate the all-or-nothing
effect of contributory negligence, while still giving the manu-
facturer some measure of protection from the less than careful
buyer. In any event, closing out light because we fear that we
38. 209 Cal. App. 2d at 571, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
39. Id. at 573, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
40. "Of course if the buyer . . . unreasonably fails to examine the
goods before he uses them, resulting injuries may be found to result
from his own action rather than proximately from a breach of war-
ranty." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 8.
41. [T]he question arises whether evidence which, in a negli-
gence suit, might be adduced as showing the injured person's
contributory negligence may not be adduced to show that harm
alleged to flow from a breach of warranty actually was other-
wise caused.
1 HURsH § 3:9 (implicitly answering in the affirmative).
1968]
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will not be able to resolve what may be illuminated, as the court
did here, is certainly not the solution.
About three months after purchasing an electric blanket the
plaintiff in Wood v. General Electric Company42 detected an
odor coming from his bedroom. Finding a smoldering blanket
but no flame, he "yanked" the blanket from the bed, pulled
out the electric connection, carried the blanket out of the bed-
room, and closed the door. Fifteen minutes after disposing of
the blanket he returned to his bedxoom where he found the
mattress on the bed in flames. After futile attempts to extin-
guish the blaze, he called the fire department which put out the
fire but only after extensive damage had been done to the resi-
dence and furnishings.
The plaintiff alleged breach of an implied warranty of mer-
chantability and fitness and negligence in the manufacture of
the blanket. The court held that as a matter of law contribu-
tory negligence was not a defense to the warranty count. The
jury verdict for defendant, however, was sustained even though
there was some ambiguity concerning the trial court's instruc-
tion.
43
This case is most unsatisfactory. If the instruction was
clear and the jury did not consider contributory negligence on
the warranty count, it could not have found for General Elec-
tric unless the vital elements of warranty were missing. If they
had found the warranty elements, negligence, and contributory
negligence, the plaintiff would have recovered full damages
under the rule that contributory negligence is not a defense
in warranty.
Dissatisfaction with this case, however, goes beyond the
inadequacy of the opinion to the more fundamental inequities of
an all-or-nothing contributory negligence rule. No doubt both
Wood and General Electric were partially responsible for the
injury. It is probable that the jury actually considered Wood's
foolish conduct, although it was done in an unreviewable manner.
If the jury is going to consider the plaintiff's conduct in any
case, it is far more desirable for the court to instruct them on
how to consider it properly than to allow them to make these
judgments without judicial guidance.
In Parkersburg Rig & Reel Company v. Freed Oil & Gas
Company,44 an oil company, contrary to trade practice, failed to
42. 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953).
43. The court's instruction appears at 159 Ohio St. 273, 277, 112
N.E.2d 8, 11.
44. 111 Kan. 37, 205 P. 1020 (1922).
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build a saving dike around newly constructed oil tanks. When
one of the tanks collapsed the company lost a great deal of oil
which could easily have been captured by a dike. The oil
company was not required to use reasonable care in guarding
against this contingency, and the defendant builder was held
liable in warranty for the entire loss.
In one respect this result is even more unreasonable than
the results in the cases previously considered. Both plaintiff
and defendant were commercially knowledgeable business men,
possessed of equal information and comparable experience. The
builder should not have been held responsible for the loss which
plaintiff could have reasonably avoided. The reasonableness of
the plaintiff's conduct should have been a question for the jury.
The possibility of injury was substantial, and the likelihood of
damage could have been retarded ab initio had plaintiff used the
care expected from anyone in his trade. When the parties stand
on an equal commercial footing it is unjust to impose liability
on one when the other could have avoided all consequential
damages by acting reasonably.
45
Defendants should not have to bear losses which plaintiffs
could have avoided by the exercise of reasonable care. A com-
parative negligence approach would relieve many of the pres-
sures which foreclose consideration of such conduct. However,
even if the contributory negligence rule is not replaced by a
comparative negligence approach, we should not ignore the buy-
er's fault in deciding warranty cases.
B. SITUATIONS IN WmIcH BUYER'S CONDUCT IS COMMONLY
CONSIDERED
Most courts do recognize that some types of buyer conduct
are relevant to a manufacturer's liability for damages in war-
ranty, even though they do not recognize contributory negligence
as a defense. These types of buyer conduct have been described
as assumption of risk, use with knowledge of a defect, use in
violation of a warning, failure to inspect, and abnormal use.
45. The Uniform Commercial Code implicitly makes this distinc-
tion in some areas. The commercial experience of the buyer goes to
the issues of the buyer's duty to inspect the goods, see Umuomx COM-
mERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 8, and the time in which inspection
should be made. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-606. See also
2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN § 16.01 [3], distinguishing the warranty action
where the injured person is a noncommercial consumer and stating,
inter alia, that it is unreasonable to require the noncommercial buyer
to make an expert inspection.
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1. Assumption of Risk
In Kassouf the court distinguished assumption of risk from
contributory negligence by stating that the former involves
actual, as opposed to constructive, knowledge of the danger and
voluntary acceptance of the risk.46 The fine distinction between
contributory negligence and assumption of risk frequently turns
on whether the buyer took the time to consider certain pos-
sibilities. There are several situations where the two defenses
overlap, resulting in a great deal of confusion. 47  It has been
said that except in cases of express agreement, assumption of
risk adds nothing to contributory negligence principles.4" Gen-
erally, where assumption of risk is found it is implied from the
surrounding circumstances. 49  Although at the extremes it is
not difficult to distinguish the two doctrines on the grounds of
actual knowledge of the danger, an objective standard is applied
in both areas, and in assumption of risk cases the plaintiff cannot
say that he did not comprehend a risk which should have been
obvious to him.50 It is even possible for the plaintiff to assume
risks of whose specific existence he is not aware.51
It is, therefore, impracticable and confusing to attempt to
categorize buyer conduct as assumption of risk or contributory
negligence. The comparative negligence jurisdictions generally
blend these forms of buyer conduct into one category of con-
tributory fault, and the jury or court weighs the contribution of
the specific behavior.52 On the other hand, the jurisdictions pre-
cluding the defense of contributory negligence unrealistically
attempt to dissect this behavior, dismissing that amounting to
contributory negligence and accepting as a defense that consti-
tuting assumption of risk. The impracticability of this distinc-
tion demonstrates not only the superiority of the comparative
negligence approach but also the weakness of the position that
certain types of buyer conduct should not be considered at all.
2. Use with Knowledge of Defect
The buyer's conduct in warranty cases bars recovery when
46. Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 572, 26 Cal. Rptr.
276, 278 (1962).
47. W. PRoSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 304 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSEM, TORTS].
48. James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
49. PROSSER, TORTS 307.
50. Id. at 310.
51. Id. See Comment, Products Liability: For the Defense-Con-
tributory Fault, 33 TENN. L. REV. 464, 473 (1966).
52. Cf. authorities cited notes 160 & 161 infra.
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it amounts to unreasonable exposure to a known and appreciated
risk.53 The right to recover for breach of warranty is lost
where the person to whom the warranty was made uses the
product with knowledge that the warranty has been broken and
suffers injury as a result of such use.5
4
The line between "use of a product with knowledge of its
defective condition" and "contributory negligence" is also a dif-
ficult one to draw. At some point the defect is so obvious that
a buyer cannot be heard to deny knowing about it. Perhaps
this would be a question for the court, or more likely for the
jury if reasonable men could differ. In any event, inquiry into
the buyer's conduct should not be precluded.
The cases which do speak in terms of the buyer's use of the
product with knowledge of its defect uniformly hold that such
use is a defense or mitigating factor to the manufacturer's lia-
bility. The purchaser has no right to continue using the de-
fective article after he has learned of the defect, if the result
of such use is to increase the damage resulting from the defect.55
The court in Pauls Valley Milling Company v. Gabbert56
stated that where a seller delivers the wrong article and the
buyer discovers this error in ample time to avoid injury but fails
to do so, then the buyer himself "is, in effect, voluntarily pro-
ducing his own injury," and the consequences of such conduct
are not properly to be inflicted upon the seller.57 This causa-
tion rationale is almost identical to that set forth in a number of
contributory negligence cases.
In Missouri Bag Company v. Chemical Delinting Company5 s
the court spoke in terms of buyer's negligence when perhaps it
would have been more accurate to speak of the buyer's knowl-
edge of the defect. When a plaintiff used seed bags knowing
53. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 86 (D. Hawaii 1961),
affd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962) (dictum); Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963); RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF ToRTs § 402A(n) (contributory negligence); 2 FRUmER
& FRImEIAN § 16.01 [3].
54. Cedar Rapids & I.C. Ry. & Light Co. v. Sprague Elec. Co.,
203 IM. App. 424, affd, 280 IMI. 386, 117 N.E. 461 (1917); Topeka Mill &
Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964 (1950) (disallowing
damages for period after buyer acquired knowledge of alleged breach);
Pauls Valley Milling Co. v. Gabbert, 182 Okla. 500, 78 P.2d 685 (1938);
2 FRUMER & FRIEDmAN § 16.01 [3].
55. Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 514 (1954) (citing over 100 cases for this
proposition).
56. 182 Okla. 500, 78 P.2d 685 (1938).
57. Id. at 503, 78 P.2d at 688.
58. 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952).
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that there were holes in them the court held that a "person
seeking to recover damages caused by the breach of implied
warranty of merchandise purchased cannot recover damages
which are proximately caused by his own negligence in using
the defective articles."
' ' 9
The court further stated that
a person seeking to recover damages caused by the purchase of
defective articles to be used by him can only recover such
damages as he could not have avoided by the exercise of reas-
sonable diligence; and he is required to make reasonable effort
to protect himself from loss. 6 0
Thus, the court introduced the doctrine known alterna-
tively as "aggravation of damages," "duty to mitigate damages,"
"avoidable consequences," or "damages which the buyer could
have avoided." The distinction between this doctrine and the
doctrine of contributory fault is that the behavioral focus of the
latter is on the conduct of the plaintiff up to the point of injury,
while the rule of avoidable damages comes into play only after
a legal wrong has occurred, but while some damage may still be
averted.61 As one author suggests, the underlying basis for the
distinction is merely the practical feasibility of assigning a part
of the damages to each of the parties at fault and, in reality,
the doctrines are the same.
62
The plaintiff must take reasonable steps to prevent loss
from a breach of contract by the defendant and, a fortiori, must
not by his own negligence enhance the damages.6 3 Similarly, in
tort cases, the rule of avoidable consequences denies recovery for
any damage which could have been avoided by reasonable con-
duct on the part of the plaintiff.6 4 In the absence of special cir-
cumstances, 65 therefore, the purchaser has no right to continue
using a defective article after he has learned of the defect if the
59. Id. at 29, 58 So. 2d at 76.
60. Id. at 30, 58 So. 2d at 76-77. Accord, Finks v. Viking Re-
frigerators, Inc., 235 Mo. App. 679, 147 S.W.2d 124 (1941) (plaintiff
used a commercial refrigerator after discovering it to be unfit and was
precluded from recovering special damages for loss of profits from and
after such discovery).
61. Armfield v. Nash, 31 Miss. 361 (1856); Bailey v. J.L. Roebuck
Co., 135 Okla. 216, 275 P. 329 (1929); Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co.,
111 Ore. 199, 225 P. 202 (1924); C. McCoRmicK, DAIMAGES § 33 (1935).
62. PROSSER, ToRTs 288.
63. See generally 5 A. CORBIN, CONTMAcTs 241-54 (1964); see note
85 infra. and accompanying text.
64. PROSSER, TORTS 287.
65. E.g., the seller's insistence on continued use of the article or
his denial that it is defective accompanied by the likelihood of greater
damage to the buyer from discontinuance of use than from continued use.
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result of such use is to increase the damage resulting from the
defect.0 The plaintiff in breach of warranty actions may not
recover damages for losses which he might reasonably have
avoided.
67
Courts have also held that added damages may not be col-
lected on a breach of warranty claim where the use of an
article known to be defective necessitated the employment of
extra help, created additional expenses for the buyer, or com-
pelled the buyer to make rebates to customers who had been
damaged. 8 When the buyer knowingly uses faulty equipment,
he himself is voluntarily producing his own injury. Thus, the
seller should not be held responsible for the consequences. 9
3. Use in Violation of Warning
The buyer may contribute to, or cause, his own injury by
using a product under conditions specifically warned against.
7°
These situations require consideration of the adequacy, reason-
ableness, and timeliness of the warning as well as of the buyer's
actions after receiving it. The notice-of-danger cases demon-
strate the difficulties of classifying buyer's conduct as negligent
or knowledgeable. If the notice is clear and communicated di-
rectly to the buyer his failure to take heed would be reckless.
However, problems arise when notice is not precise or is indi-
rectly communicated to the buyer. Sometimes the use of a
product contrary to instructions presents the court with an easy
case.7' However, in some jurisdictions, no inquiry may be made
66. Wilkinson v. Rich's, Inc., 77 Ga. App. 239, 48 S.E.2d 552 (1948);
Fuller v. Curtis, 100 Ind. 237, 50 Am. Rep. 786 (1884); Davis v. Fish,
1 Greene 406, 48 Am. Dec. 387 (Iowa 1848); notes 58-60 supra and
accompanying text; authorities cited note 54 supra; 1 HTJsH 3:10.
67. George v. Crowder, 287 F. 53 (4th Cir. 1923); Cedar Rapids &
I.C. Ry. & Light Co. v. Sprague Elec. Co., 203 Ill. App. 429, affd, 280
Ill. 386, 117 N.E. 461 (1917); Frier v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co.,
173 Kan. 733, 252 P.2d 850 (1953); Sapp v. Bradfield, 137 Ky. 308, 125
S.W. 721 (1910); Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss.
13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952); Razey v. J.B. Colt Co., 106 App. Div. 103, 94
N.Y.S. 59 (1905); Northern Supply Co. v. Wangard, 123 Wis. 1, 100
N.W. 1066 (1904); 46 Am. Ju. Sales § 756 (1943).
68. E.g., Cooper v. National Fertilizer Co., 132 Ga. 529, 64 S.E. 650
(1909); 46 Am. Jul. Sales § 756 (1965 Supp. nn.13.5-.53).
69. See note 57 supra.
70. Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d
11 (1938). Cf. Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850
(1945). Compare McClaren v. G.S. Robins & Co., 349 Mo. 653, 162
S.W.2d 856 (1942) (involving sufficiency of the warning against the
danger of inhaling carbon tetrachloride fumes).
71. E.g., Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18
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into such seemingly improper conduct.72  Surely in these situa-
tions it is wise to have the trier of fact consider all aspects of
the buyer's conduct rather than to have an exclusionary rule
based on attenuated notions of negligence or recklessness.
4. Failure To Inspect
Problems concerning buyer's appreciation of defects in prod-
ucts are also raised by the buyer's responsibility to inspect his
purchases.73 After delivery the buyer must, where possible, in-
spect the goods and determine whether they meet the require-
ments of the contract. Inspection must be made within a rea-
sonable time.74 Consequential damages are not recoverable
where the buyer should have discovered the defect before in-
curring the damages.7 5 Questions involving the timeliness and
sufficiency of inspection are usually jury questions typically in-
volving the buyer's notice of defects and the reasonableness of
his actions thereafter.
N.E.2d 11 (1938) (using highly inflammable fluid in a manner clearly
contrary to instructions).
72. E.g., Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957)
(handling of elevator contrary to instructions no defense).
In McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967),
the court held the defendant-distributor liable on the basis of strict
liability, even though the plaintiff's wife contributed to her own injury
by using a permanent wave solution on her bleached hair despite the
warning on the package that it was for use on "normal or resistant
hair." The court stated that "this species of contributory negligence is
not a defense to strict liability." Id. at 792.
73. The buyer's failure to inspect his equipment may directly
contribute to his injury. Other doctrines which are less directly con-
nected to buyer's appreciation of defects, such as buyer's failure to
notify seller of the defect within a reasonable time, are omitted from
this discussion. See, e.g., UrFomw COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607; UNIFoRM
SALES ACT § 49. Compare Texas Motorcoaches v. A.C.F. Motors Co.,
154 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1946), and Pauls Valley Milling Co. v. Gabbert,
182 Okla. 500, 78 P.2d 685 (1938), and National Container Corp. v.
Regal Corrugated Box Co., 383 Pa. 499, 119 A.2d 270 (1956), with
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (notice not required in warranty tort action).
74. Pratt-Gilbert Co. v. Hildreth, 24 Ariz. 141, 207 P. 364 (1922);
Jackson v. Porter Land & Water Co., 151 Cal. 32, 39, 90 P. 122, 125
(1907); Johnston v. Lanter, 87 Kan. 32, 123 P. 719 (1912); cf. Square
Deal Mach. Co. v. Garrett Corp., 128 Cal. App. 2d 286, 275 P.2d 46
(1954). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(3) (b), Comment; id.
§ 2-607; UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 47, 49.
75. Tomita v. Johnson, 49 Idaho 643, 290 P. 395 (1930); Turner v.
Bruner, 263 P.2d 191 (Okla. 1953); Pauls Valley Milling Co. v. Gabbert,




Where there is no specific knowledge of the danger but the
buyer uses the product in a manner contrary to its normal use,
he may be deemed to be on notice of the danger.7 6 The con-
siderations here are similar to those in the sufficiency of the
warning to the buyer cases. Breach of warranty is shown by
proof of the failure of a product when the product is being put
to its normal intended use37 Liability for breach of warranty
does not exist where the warranted product was being used for
a purpose different from that intended by the manufacturer.7 8
In jurisdictions where contributory negligence is not a de-
fense to breach of warranty the outcome of the case may thus
depend on the formulation of the issue. General aims of uni-
formity and predictability of results in similar fact situations,
as well as fairness to individual litigants, are thereby frus-
trated. The questions cannot properly be phrased in terms of
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, use with knowl-
edge of defects, use after specific warning, failure to inspect,
or unintended, improper, or reckless use. The verbalization of
these categories implies well defined boundaries, yet neither
the judiciary nor the commentators have been able to identify
the circumstances to which any of the categories have exclusive
application. Moreover, based on the very nature of man and
commerce we cannot expect to draw distinctions accurately based
on knowledge, negligence, recklessness, or notice. In many areas
of the law such distinctions must necessarily be made, but the
decision based on them is left to the jury.79 However, too much
is made to turn on these admittedly difficult conceptual distinc-
tions when the choice of labels completely forecloses considera-
tion of certain issues. There are two available, viable alterna-
tives to such a procedure: 1) The courts, recognizing the diffi-
culties inherent in the present system of classification and ex-
76. Neusus v. De-Lux Neon Mfg., 369 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1966);
Natale v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 282, 182 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1959);
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel 824-26.
77. Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 464,
227 P.2d 923 (1951).
78. Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946); Silver-
man v. Swift & Co., 141 Conn. 450, 107 A.2d 277 (1954); Ross v. Dia-
mond Match Co., 149 Me. 360, 102 A.2d 858 (1953); Cheli v. Cudahy
Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N.W. 414 (1934); Lawson v. Benjamin
Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. App. Ct. 1944); cf. Foster v. Ford
Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 P. 945 (1926).
79. Ordinarily the question whether the buyer has been negligent
in using the article for the purpose intended is one for the determina-
tion of the jury. Poland v. Miller, 95 Ind. 387, 48 Am. Rep. 730 (1883).
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clusion, could allow the jury to consider all elements of the
buyer's conduct in determining the extent of manufacturer
liability. 2) Under the present system, operative in a majority
of jurisdictions, the buyer's contributory fault could go only to
the measure of damages and not to the manufacturer's liability.
This would ameliorate the all-or-nothing effect of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk, while taking into account
the manufacturer's responsibility for his product. A well drafted
comparative negligence statute, unfettered by notions of stare
decisis, could thus provide an immediate mechanism for analy-
sis of all facets of buyer's conduct.80
C. EXCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The earliest cases holding that contributory negligence, as
such, is not a defense to breach of warrranty actions most
often involved food, abnormal or inherently dangerous prod-
ucts, or actual foreseeable physical injurysoa The manufacturer's
strict liability was based on his creation of and profit from a
product which presented a potentially great risk to those pur-
chasing or using it. However, the view that contributory negli-
gence is no defense in warranty has not been confined to these
areas.
Negligence, in the sense of lack of due care, is not the basis
for strict liability in warranty. One may be liable in warranty
even if he has exercised the greatest degree of care. The plain-
tiff need not prove that the manufacturer was negligent, nor
is the manufacturer permitted to prove that he exercised due
care. One may be held to strict liability even though he is en-
tirely free from moral blame and innocent of mind, if he un-
avoidably violates an artificial standard. Strict liability attaches
liability by reason of the defendant's creation of the risk, profit-
seeking motive, and risk-bearing capacity. Thus, it may be
argued that contributory negligence should not be a defense to
strict liability. Nevertheless, all courts consider certain types of
buyer's conduct in determining what the plaintiff should recover
in strict liability cases. Thus, the courts do not categorically ex-
clude the buyer's contribution to his own injury in assessing his
proper recovery. It cannot therefore be said that there is no
relative fault in warranty nor that the courts have so decided.
Many courts reason that contributory negligence cannot be
a defense in warranty, since warranty was historically an as-
80. See notes 149-57 supra and accompanying text.
80a. E.g., Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933).
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sumpsit actionsob While it might be proper to consider the buy-
er's contributory negligence when product-caused personal in-
jury occurs in the traditional tort setting, these courts argue
that such a theory is foreign to the nature of a contract action,
and that consideration of it is thus foreclosed. They then go on
to emphasize the policy of protecting consumers from injury due
to defectively manufactured products regardless of the buyer's
fault in contributing to his injury.
The doctrine of mitigation of damages, however, is used to
prevent the buyer from benefiting from aggravation of his in-
jury caused by his reckless behavior. When, in effect, the ac-
tion is the traditional tort action, plaintiff's use of the warranty
rubric should not prevent consideration of the buyer's conduct.
Perhaps such conduct is irrelevant to the issue of replacement
of defective equipment since such a defect itself is a breach of
warranty for which the buyer is seldom responsible."' However,
it is unjust to ignore buyer conduct beyond that point. Conse-
quential damages resulting from the defective product should
not be awarded without scrutiny of the contributory fault of
the parties.
The refusal to allow the contributory negligence defense
in warranty because the cause of action is contractual in nature
has little firm basis. Warranty is "a freak hybrid born of the
illicit intercourse of tort and contract."
82
A more notable example of legal miscegenation could hardly be
cited than that which produced the modern action for breach of
warranty. Originally sounding in tort, yet arising out of the
warrantor's consent to be bound, it later ceased necessarily to be
consensual, and at the same time came to lie mainly in con-
tract.8 3
If we refuse to look at buyer's negligence because of the con-
tractual nature of warranty, then clearly we should refuse to
80b. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d
479 (3d Cir. 1959); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156
A.2d 568 (1959).
81. Of course the manufacturer should still be permitted to prove
that the buyer and not the manufacturer caused the defect as well as
further damage.
82. Prosser, Strict Liability 1126. Because of the problems caused
by viewing warranty as contractual, Dean Prosser has suggested that
strict liability in tort rather than breach of warranty be employed as
the theory of recovery in products liability cases. He contends that this
analysis explains the courts' treatment of buyer conduct, since assump-
tion of risk, use in violation of warning, abnormal use, etc. are defenses
to strict liability in tort, but contributory negligence is not. Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel 838-39.
83. Book Note, 42 HARv. L. REV. 414-15 (1929).
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look at the same conduct when the action is purely contractual.
However, this is exactly contrary to what actually happens.
The buyer's conduct is indeed considered in ascertaining the
proper measure of damages in breach of contract.8 4  The courts
refuse to award the buyer damages which he reasonably could
have avoided. They speak in terms of knowledge or negligence
and preclude recovery if the buyer was culpable under either
heading. Further support for this general proposition is found
both in the Restatement of Contract 5 and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 6
The courts also uniformly hold there can be no recovery of
damages in contract from the resale of goods known by the
buyer to be defective.8 7 Similarly, it is not an excuse for the
continued use and consumption of the product that it was re-
quired by the exigencies of the buyer's business. It is also im-
material that the buyer, while continuing to use and consume
the property, made objections to the quality.8 8
84. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
85. "Damages are not recoverable for harm that the plaintiff
should have foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable effort with-
out undue risk, expense, or humiliation." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 336 (1932).
86. The Uniform Commercial Code, now adopted in forty-nine
states, perhaps provides a ready mechanism for the courts to analyze
thoroughly buyers' conduct. A jurisdiction which formerly held lack of
buyers' care no defense in warranty could now adopt such a defense
with little embarrassment, reasoning that the new result is dictated by
the recently adopted Code, despite case law to the contrary. However,
since these "dictates" of the Code have long been in the common law
or Uniform Sales Act, this suggestion is born out of judicial graceful-
ness rather than candidness.
In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of course neces-
sary to show not only the existence of the warranty but the fact
that the warranty was broken and that the breach of the war-
ranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained. In such an
action an affirmative showing by the seller that the loss resulted
from some action or event following his own delivery of the
goods can operate as a defense .... Action by the buyer fol-
lowing an examination of the goods, which ought to have indi-
cated the defect complained of can be shown as a matter bear-
ing on whether the breach itself was the cause of the injury.
UNIFomv COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 13.
[I]f the buyer discovers the defect and uses the goods anyway,
or if he unreasonably fails to examine the goods before he uses
them, resulting injuries may be found to result from his own
action rather than proximately from a breach of warranty.
Id. § 2-316 (3) (b), Comment 8.
87. Regal Motor Prods., Inc. v. Bender, 102 Ohio App. 447, 139
N.E.2d 463 (1956) (such action held to be full acceptance of goods in
defective condition). See also authorities cited note 68 supra.
88. See generally 46 Am. JuR. Sales § 765 (1943).
Not every such use precludes recovery as where one who dis-
covers defects in the trial drive of a horse must use the horse to return
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The courts' views concerning the proper measure of damages
in contract or nonpersonal injury warranty actions are indicative
of their reluctance to award damages for injuries removed from
the initial transaction. Thus, the application of the rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale in warranty 9 readily allows recovery for a
defective article, but beyond that, consequential damage must
have been expected as a probable consequence of the defect 0
At the extreme, prospective profits must be proved with reason-
able certainty,9' and unless they plainly would have been made,
they are not allowable 2 In addition, the plaintiff must satisfy a
heavy burden of persuasion before his damages include alienation
of customers 3 These rules which require unequivocal proof of
remote damages are rooted in the belief that the further we get
from the original transaction the more opportunity there is for
the buyer negligently to allow damages to pyramid, and the
less responsible the seller should be for these consequences.
Thus, the general refusal to recognize contributory negli-
gence as a defense in warranty is clearly unjustified, since it is
based on the misclassification of warranty as an essentially con-
tractual concept and a misinterpretation of the effects of that
misclassification.
D. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A DEFENSE
No satisfactory justification has been offered for holding that
contributory negligence is not a defense in actions for breach
of warranty. The courts cry out against the willful creation of
an unreasonable risk to others by the abnormal conduct in-
to the starting point. Fox v. Wilkinson, 133 Wis. 337, 339, 113 N.W.
669, 671 (1907) (dictum). Although this fact situation is practically
archaic, several modern situations are imaginable where it is impos-
sible, impracticable, or inordinately costly to cease using goods known to
be defective.
89. See authorities cited note 108 supra; UNxiomw COmmEcIAL
CODE §§ 2-714(2), -715(2). See generally Annot., 32 A.L.R. 120 (1924)
(excellent discussion of the rule).
90. Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903);
3 S. WMLrISTOX, SALES § 614(b) (rev. ed. 1948).
91. Superwood Corp. v. Larson-Stang, Inc., 311 F.2d 735 (8th Cir.
1963); Isenberg v. Lemon, 84 Ariz. 364, 329 P.2d 882 (1958); Henning-
sen v. Mayfair Packing Co., 41 Cal. 2d 558, 261 P.2d 521 (1953); Moran
v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.Y. 87, 105 N.E. 217 (1914) (Cardozo, J.);
Buob v. Feenaughty Mach. Co., 4 Wash. 2d 276, 103 P.2d 325 (1940);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 331 (1932).
92. 4 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 614(b) (rev. ed. 1948).
93. Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.Y. 187, 105 N.E. 217 (1914)
(Cardozo, J.), cited with approval in Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Griffith,
43 F.2d 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1930).
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herent in most warranty cases. They seek to fix "the absolute
responsibility for preventing the harm upon the defendant
whether his conduct is regarded as fundamentally anti-social, or
he is considered merely to be in a better position to transfer the
loss to the community." 94 However, it is one thing to hold the
manufacturer presumptively liable without inquiry into the re-
alities of these premises and regardless of his proof of negligence
and quite another to use the same arguments to hold him
liable for the fault of someone else. The fact that there is such
a concept as strict liability, in the sense that proof of negligence
is not required, in no way requires, that contributory negli-
gence not be a defense.9 5
Thus, several courts which continue to hold that contributory
negligence is not a defense in warranty have mitigated the rigid-
ity of the rule by tactics which actually focus on the buyer's
conduct. In Chapman v. Brown,96 the court analyzed the prob-
lem of a young lady injured when a hula skirt she was wearing
caught fire. The court held that the plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence was not a bar to a suit based on implied warranty.
The court saw a form of comparative negligence as the solu-
tion to the problem but nevertheless decided the case along more
traditional lines. It reasoned that
the doctrine of contributory negligence, which takes no account
of the comparative negligence of the parties, often produces
results far from equitable, and for that reason is not likely to
be adopted by the Hawaii courts in its full strictness . . .as a
complete defense in cases ... based on... warranty .... 97
The jury, however, was allowed to take the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence into account in fixing the amount of dam-
ages, even though the defendant's counsel did not ask for a rule
of comparative negligence or instructions permitting the jury to
consider the plaintiff's negligence in mitigation of damages.9 8
94. PRossE, TORTs 341. See Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22
GEo. L.J. 674, 689-97 (1934).
95. See 2 FRumER & FRIMAx § 16.01 [3].
96. 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961). afl'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1962).
97. Id. at 85-86.
98. Id. at 86. This view produces a result identical to the Missis-
sippi comparative negligence statute. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 1454 (1942).
That is, even if the plaintiff is 99% at fault he may maintain his action,
the degree of fault going to the issue of damages and not liability. Note
that the effect of such language is to have the buyer's conduct affect
the extent of the manufacturer's liability and tacitly put in operation
a form of comparative negligence. It would be preferable for the court
to be more candid since such an opinion obscures its purpose and will
be misleading in different circumstances.
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The court in Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp.9 summarily ruled
out plaintiff's conduct as contributory negligence but found for
the manufacturer by application of a causation requirement.
In actions involving claimed breaches of warranty in connection
with the sale of a machine the question as to whether it was a
faulty machine and the question as to whether it was faultily
operated by the buyer are inextricably entwined .... Claimed
fault on the part of the buyer in the operation of a machine pur-
chased by him is sometimes referred to as negligence. However,
as heretofore noted, negligence is not involved in actions for
breach of warranty. Claimed fault on the part of the buyer
in connection with the operation of a machine is connected with
the matter of proximate cause and direct and natural result.'0 0
In Natale v. Pepsi Cola Company'' an exploding Pepsi bot-
tle injured the plaintiff. The court refused to preclude defendant
from fixing the fault on someone other than himself, and the
jury was permitted to consider the effect of the handling of the
bottle between the time or purchase and the time of the explo-
sion.
If the essential cause of the occurrence was something other
than the breach of the implied warranty, no matter what, the
defendant is not liable .... [D]efendant would not be liable
if the accident essentially occurred by reason of mishandling
whether by plaintiff or any other person between the time of
purchase and the time of the occurrence .... [T]he breach of
the implied warranty . . . which gives rise to the liability ...
must [be] causally related to the alleged injuries .... A party
cannot recover for a loss that he could have averted by the ex-
ercise of reasonable care.
102
The reasoning in Natale and Rasmus is consistent with the
principle of causation as a sine qua non to the recovery of conse-
quential damages in an action in warranty or in negligence.
03
99. 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958). Plaintiff-buyer indepen-
dently installed removal equipment in an hermetic storage bin built
by defendant for plaintiff to keep corn at a particular moisture level.
Much testimony went to the issue of whether plaintiff's installation was
without care thereby altering the moisture level fixed by defendant
and thus causing the spoilage of plaintiff's corn.
100. Id. at 95.
[W]hen it is considered that liability for breach of warranty
exists only where it is shown that the breach was the proximate
cause of the harm for which recovery is sought, the question
arises whether evidence, which, in a negligence suit, might be
adduced as showing the injured person's contributory negligence
may not be adduced to show that the harm alleged to flow
from a breach of warranty actually was otherwise caused.
1 Hunsa § 3:9.
101. 7 App. Div. 2d 282, 182 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1959) (infant's eye in-
jured when soda bottle he was attempting to open on a school gate
exploded).
102. 7 App. Div. 2d at 284, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
103. Accord, Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th
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A number of jurisdictions do formally recognize contributory
negligence as a defense to breach of warranty. 0 4 In Razey v.
J. B. Colt Company,0 5 Colt sold Razey an acetylene generator for
use in Razey's photographic business. A lighted gas jet in Ra-
zey's living room ignited the gas from the generator and caused
an explosion resulting in personal injury and property damage.
Granting that a warranty of fitness existed, the court observed
that Razey's use of the generator in a room with a lighted gas
jet was in violation of a local safety ordinance and was a negli-
gent use of the machine. Notwithstanding the fact that this
case involved personal injury, which often calls into operation
stricter standards, 0 6 the court said:
Where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for a breach of a
general warranty, which are usually the difference between the
value of the thing as it is in fact and as it was warranted to
be, the question of negligence does not enter; but, where he
seeks to recover consequential damages, he should not be per-
mitted to recover for his own negligence .... Warranty is not
insurance, and there is nothing in this contract to indicate that
either party supposed the defendant was to answer for the
plaintiff's carelessness. If it is impossible to separate the conse-
Cir. 1962) (woman set afire when match ignited her nightgown). The
court permitted the jury to find that the nightgown plaintiff wore was
not unusual or dangerously combustible and plaintiff's injuries were
solely and proximately caused by her own negligence in smoking and
handling matches in bed while in a semiconscious state induced by a
potent sleeping pill.
104. Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962);
Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equip. Co., 138 So. 2d 777 (Fla. App.
1962); Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955); Mis-
souri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71
(1952); Finks v. Viking Refrigerators, Inc., 235 Mo. App. 679, 147 S.W.2d
124 (1941); Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 281 N.Y. 474, 24 N.E.2d 131
(1939); Fredendall v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 279 N.Y. 146, 18 N.E.2d
11 (1938); Natale v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 7 A-pp. Div. 2d 282, 182 N.Y.S.2d
404 (1959); Razey v. J.B. Colt Co., 106 App. Div. 103, 94 N.Y.S. 59
(1905); cf. Damer v. State, 34 Misc. 2d 363, 228 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct.
1962); Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S.E.2d 668 (1941).
For further support of this proposition consider those products lia-
bility cases based on breach of warranty which have simply ruled on
the question of contributory negligence without discussing its avail-
ability as a defense. E.g., Arnaud's Restaurant, Inc. v. Cotter, 212 F.2d
883 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 915 (1955); Sapiente v. Wal-
tuch, 127 Conn. 224, 15 A.2d 417 (1940); Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 225
N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. 471 (1918).
105. 106 App. Div. 103, 94 N.Y.S. 59 (1935).
106. There is a distinction between the case involving personal
injury due to a defect in the product andt the situation where loss of
goodwill or profits result from the inability to properly fulfill con-
tractual commitments. It is in personal injury cases that the courts are
more inclined to overlook buyer's fault and apply stricter standards
to the manufacturer.
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quences of the plaintiff's negligence from the consequences of
the defendant's breach of warranty, then the plaintiff must be
limited to general damages, for otherwise he is permitted to
recover for his own fault. We can discover no reason why he
should be permitted to recover any damages, which his own
negligence has contributed to produce .... 107
If there is a defect in the equipment, the manufacturer would be
liable for the difference between the value of the generator
sold and the value if it was as warranted. 08 Consideration
of the buyer's fault would be limited to the issue of consequen-
tial damages. 0 9 The court also stated that the buyer could not
recover for his own fault. These two propositions, however, run
head long into each other where the product is defective and
the buyer improperly uses it causing damage only to the prod-
uct itself. If the buyer's use was despite knowledge of the
danger, issues of assumption of risk and use of product with
knowledge of its defects are raised. When injury to only the
article itself occurs from the combination of the defect and the
buyer's negligence the case for strict liability plus disallowing
inquiry into contributory fault is most strongly presented. It is
not unreasonable in such a case to foreclose consideration of
the buyer's conduct if the manufacturer's absolute liability is
judiciously limited to the article sold. Beyond this, however,
there is little justification for ignoring the buyer's conduct.
The more troublesome cases are those in which the manu-
facturer must pay not only for the equipment, but also for per-
sonal injury, property damage, loss of profits, goodwill, pro-
spective profits, and other consequential damages. The recovery
sought should definitely be a factor which the courts consider in
deciding what weight to give to buyer's conduct in these cases.
A manufacturer should be absolutely liable to replace any de-
107. 106 App. Div. at 106, 94 N.Y.S. at 61.
108. The Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code
employ the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 (1854), as the
general measure of damages in warranty cases, viz., the difference be-
tween the value of the article actually furnished the buyer and the
value the article would have had if the article conformed to the war-
ranty. United States v. Goodman, 111 F. Supp. 32 (W.D.N.C. 1953);
Bracher v. American Natl Food, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 2d 338, 284 P.2d
163 (1955); Mills v. Meyer, 40 Wash. 2d 369, 243 P.2d 491 (1952); 3
S. WILLiSTON, SALEs § 366 (rev. ed. 1948); cf. Tuttle v. Bootes Hatcheries
& Packing Co., 112 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1953); Zachry v. McKown,
326 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
Proof of special circumstances is required for a greater amount of
damages and consequential damages may be recovered in a proper
case. UNFomv COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, Comment 2.
109. See Note, The Role of Contributory Negligence in Warranty
Actions, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 492 (1963).
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fective product he produces, regardless of how negligently it is
handled, but this should not be confused with imposition of the





The primary justification for the rule of contributory negli-
gence is the feeling that if one man is to be held liable because
of his fault, then the fault of the party seeking to enforce that
liability should also be considered."' A comparative negligence
approach applied to the parties' conduct in warranty actions is
consistent with this principle and will give more equitable and
less oppressive results than the all-or-nothing contributory neg-
ligence rule.
In the United States the concept of comparative negligence
means the apportionment of liability doctrine embodied in stat-
utes, partially or entirely abrogating the common law rule un-
der which contributory negligence is an absolute bar to re-
covery. These statutes provide that contributory negligence is
relevant only to mitigation of damages. 1 2 The suggestion that
comparative negligence be applied in warranty actions is appar-
ently a novel one," 3 yet the principles of that doctrine mesh
perfectly with the concepts of buyer's conduct discussed above.
110. The concession that inquiry into buyer's conduct is unnecessary
when recovery is limited to the article itself is made with qualification
and only against the background of strict liability for manufactured
products. The argument that the buyer should bear some of the loss
whenever his conduct contributes to his injury, whether it be product-
centered or consequential, is a weighty one.
111. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW Or TORTS 1207 (1956).
112. See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1261 (1958) (cases cited
therein); 38 AM. JuR. Negligence § 233 (1941).
113. In fact, after checking the warranty cases in the comparative
negligence jurisdictions and the authorities in the field, it appears that
this suggestion has not previously been advanced. I believe this is
merely a reflection on the current status of comparative negligence in
the negligence area and should not be taken to indicate its inappli-
cability in the warranty field. There is no doubt in this writer's mind
that comparative negligence will eventually replace the outmoded doc-
trine of contributory negligence in the negligence area. At that time
commentators will question whether the warranty field is next. It
should be. Throughout this Article I have pointed to areas where anal-
ysis of buyer's contributory negligence would be appropriate. Occa-
sionally I have stated that comparative negligence would be even more
preferable. Below I will first demonstrate that comparative negligence




Since the doctrine of comparative negligence is basically a
rule for the apportionment of damages, 1 4 one major argument
against consideration of the buyer's conduct is obviated. It has
been argued that the manufacturer should be held absolutely
liable for the difference between the actual value of the product
and its value as warranted. The comparative negligence ap-
proach assumes that full compensation for the product as war-
ranted will be given in breach of warranty cases, but provides
for further inquiry into the buyer's conduct in dealing with the
product on the issue of consequential damages. On this issue
the jury should clearly be permitted to weigh the contribution
of the plaintiff against the contribution of the defendant.
Such a comparative negligence concept is appropriate in war-
ranty. Both components of warranty, tort and contract, have
a doctrine involving apportionment of damages. The rubric
"warranty" should not, therefore, prevent application of a
method of allocating damages. If objections are proferred on the
basis of negligence versus warranty distinctions, we might use
the term "comparative fault" rather than "comparative negli-
gence." Although the terms may be used synonymously, "com-
parative fault" more accurately emphasizes the proper focus.
Several methods of apportioning damages are possible. At
first glance, the process of apportionment in warranty may seem
to be a process of subtraction, beginning with the defendant
one hundred per cent to blame and deducting the plaintiff's con-
tribution. This process is certainly preferable to the total bar-
ring effect of the contributory negligence rule or to a categorical
refusal to consider such negligence. Some states perhaps will
not tolerate any award to a plaintiff who is grossly negligent,
while the fault of the defendant was only slight. If a defect is
apparent, or could have been discovered with a reasonable in-
spection, or if the plaintiff imprudently used the article, the
jury might find him eighty per cent blameworthy. A legislature
could set a cutoff providing, for example, that a plaintiff who
is more than seventy-five per cent negligent is precluded from
114. 38 Am. JuR. Negligence § 231 (1941). The plaintiff's negli-
gence operates, not to relieve the defendant entirely from liability, but
merely to diminish the damages recoverable.
The term apportionment is used in its broadest sense. Thus, sub-
tracting from the plaintiff's damages will be considered as much an
apportionment as if damages were allocated between each of two in-
jured parties. Actually, the apportionment doctrine is an apportionment
(or allocation) of fault realized through an adjustment in the damages.
It should be clear that we are using the degree of buyer's contributory
fault to offset the amount of his recovery.
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recovering anything, or it might simply preclude recovery by a
plaintiff whose negligence was "gross." This would prevent
unjustified and harassing claims brought by reckless buyers on
the chance of getting some compensation.
Such cutoffs are no more difficult for the jury to apply than
the present criteria for contributory negligence vel non."0
They will provide fairer results in the majority of cases falling
within the cutoff points. When compared with the thought proc-
ess required to mitigate damages in the misuse of product or
avoidable damages situations, the problems are indistinguish-
able.
However, merely because some degree of the fault will in-
itially be attributed to defendant does not ineluctably lead
to the subtraction-from-the-manufacturer thesis. The natural
tendency is to fix on the party most noticeably blameworthy
and subtract the other's fault from that. Admittedly there is the
possibility that a few extra percentage points of fault will sym-
pathetically be attributed to one of the parties, but in the end
the balancing will be accomplished as if the jury had inde-
pendently appraised the contribution of each party. Careful
instruction could probably provide that the jury subtract the
buyer's fault from one hundred per cent and not vice versa.
The question remains whether this will produce results differ-
ent from a more general instruction allowing freer balancing.
There should be no difficulty with limiting the manufacturer's
presumed negligence to the issue of liability and allowing the
jury to consider the actual degree of culpability in the issue of
damages. No a priori logic dictates a starting point of one hun-
dred per cent culpability attributed to the manufacturer. On the
contrary, after relegating the presumed negligence to the issue of
liability, it would seem most just to allow the jury to balance
degrees of fault as they see fit, limited perhaps by some cutoff
standard.
B. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST CoMPAIAA'IvE FAuLT
The comparative fault approach seems ideally suited to solv-
ing the problem of the role of the buyer's conduct in products
liability cases. The criticism directed at the comparative negli-
gence statutes, however, may also be applicable to the compara-
tive fault approach in products liability.
115. When a juror finds a plaintiff contributorily negligent he is,
in fact, using a 1% (or thereabouts) cutoff.
[Vol. 52:627
BUYER'S CONDUCT
Although the doctrine of comparative negligence has met
with some criticism, 116 judging from the support it has received,
its eventual acceptance throughout the United States seems in-
evitable." 7 Most courts, however, still reject it,118 "not because
it's unsound as a matter of logic or technical theory ... but be-
cause experience has shown, as a practical matter that it is not
workable, there being no usable yardstick to measure the relative
fault of the parties.""19
The comparative negligence doctrine is not, however, sub-
stantially weakened by the law's inability to measure precisely
how much of the damage suffered is attributable to the plain-
tiff's own fault. It would be preferable to grant seventy per cent
erroneously, instead of an ideal sixty-three per cent, than to
grant one hundred per cent or nothing. Civil law jurisdictions
regularly apportion damages 120 and appear to have no difficulty
administering the system. Except for the United States all ma-
jor English-speaking countries apportion damages.12 ' American
common law courts will make apportionments in conflicts cases
where the law of a comparative negligence jurisdiction is ap-
plicable, as well as in the obvious cases of avoidable damages.
Division of damages according to fault is found in cases where
plaintiff and defendant both pollute the same stream12 2 or
116. E.g., Body, Comparative Negligence: The Views of a Trial
Lawyer, 44 A.B.A.J. 346 (1958); Harkavy, Comparative Negligence:
The Reflections of a Skeptic, 43 A.B.A.J. 1115 (1957); McKinnon, The
Case Against Comparative Negligence, 28 S.B. CAL. J. 23 (1953); Pal-
mer, Let Us Be Frank About Comparative Negligence, 28 Los ANGELES
B. BULL. 37 (1952); Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary
Check on The American Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1957).
117. Bress, Comparative Negligence: Let Us Hearken To The Call
of Progress, 43 A.B.A.J. 127 (1957); Duniway, California Should Adopt
A "Comparative Negligence" Law, 28 S.B. CAL. J. 22 (1953); Gregory,
Loss Distribution in Torts, 45 VA. L. REv. 63 (1959); Prosser, Compara-
tive Negligence, 51 AftcH. L. REv. 465 (1953); authorities cited notes
121, 136, 141 infra.
118. Annot., 114 A.L.R. 836-37 (1938) (citing cases).
119. Wittstruck v. Lee, 62 S.D. 290, 296, 252 N.W. 874, 877 (1934).
See Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 493, 499, 82 Am. Dec. 537 (1862); Lowndes,
Contributory Negligence, 22 GEO. L.J. 674, 708 (1934).
120. PRossER, TORTS 297 n.18.
121. Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 349 Mich. 387, 400, 84 N.W.2d 840, 844
(1957) (dictum); Shroeder, The Courts and Comparative Negligence,
A.B.A. INSURANCE SECTION, PROCEEDINGS 41-54 (1950); Turk, Compara-
tive Negligence on the March, (pts. 1 & 2), 28 CM.-KXNT L. REv. 189,
304 (1950).
122. Bowman v. Humphrey, 132 Iowa 324, 109 N.W. 714 (1906); Ran-
dolf v. Town of Bloomfield, 77 Iowa 50, 41 N.W. 562 (1889); cf. Walters
v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 85 Okla. 77, 204 P. 906 (1922).
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flood the plaintiff's property,123 where two or more defendants
pollute a stream, 124 where two defendants inflict personal injury
on separable areas of the plaintiff,125 where defendants' animals
together cause injury, 26 and in cases involving nuisance due to
noise 2 7 or air pollution. 28 By the same token, apportionment
is made in cases of separate repetitions of the same defamatory
statements' 9 or separate acts resulting in alienation of affec-
tions.
130
The difficulty of making a division of damages is greatly
overstated and in no event is it sufficient justification for all
or nothing liability.' 3 ' The task is no more difficult than placing
a price tag on reputation in defamation or pain and suffering in
personal injury cases.
Several statutes have abolished the all-or-nothing effect of
contributory negligence and provide for the apportionment of
damages. 32 Juries have experienced little difficulty in follow-
ing the apportionment of damage rules. Juries of other states,
at least where they must state the basis of their apportionment,
have not been confounded when compelled to apply such a rule
under the principles of conflict of laws.
3 3
It has been argued that satisfactory results are achieved
even under the contributory negligence rule by jurors who ig-
nore the letter of the court's instruction and render a verdict
conforming to their general notions of justice and fair play.
1 34
123. Philadelphia & R.R.R. v. Smith, 64 F. 679 (3d Cir. 1894).
124. Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N.W. 572
(1933); Snavely v. City of Goldendale, 10 Wash. 2d 453, 117 P.2d 221
(1941).
125. Albrecht v. St. Hedwig's Roman Catholic Benevolent Soc'y,
205 Mich. 395, 171 N.W. 461 (1919); McAllister v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324
Pa. 65, 187 A. 415 (1936).
126. Hill v. Chappel Bros., 93 Mont. E2, 18 P.2d 106 (1933); Wood
v. Snider, 187 N.Y. 28, 79 N.E. 858 (1907).
127. Sherman Gas & Elec. Co. v. Belden, 103 Tex. 59, 123 S.W. 119
(1909).
128. O'Neal v. Southern Carbon Co., 216 La. 96, 43 So. 2d 230 (1949).
129. PROssER, TORTS 228 n.80.
130. Id. at 228 n.81.
131. Cf. id. at 229.
132. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964);
Merchant Marine Act, 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1964). Many state labor
acts consider the workmen's contributory fault in the award of damages.
Cf. cases cited note 150 infra. See generally Mole & Wilson, A Study of
Comparative Negligence (pts. 1 & 2), 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 604 (1932).
133. INsTITUTE OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION OF NEW YORK, COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 13 (1955).
134. Haeg v. Sprague Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 530, 281 N.W.
261, 263 (1938); PROSSER, TORTS 298; James, Accident Liability: Some
Wartime Developments, 55 YALE LJ.. 365 (1946).
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A system which succeeds only by utter disregard of its basic
rules is clearly unsatisfactory. Adherence to fundamental rules,
ease of application, and, perhaps, predictability13 5 would be
furthered if we used a rule which allows the jury to decide in
accordance with the court's instructions rather than the jurors'
individually centered emotions. In any event, a jury can ignore
the contributory negligence rules only if the judge lets the case
reach it. Where the plaintiff's negligence is slight but irrefutable
the judge must direct a verdict for defendant. There are, no
doubt, some dutiful jurors who apply the contributory negli-
gence instruction to the letter. If the comparative negligence
approach is just and feasible, its application should be required,
rather than left to the conscience of the jury.
The fears that have been expressed that a comparative neg-
ligence rule would remove the deterrent effect of the contribu-
tory negligence rule on suits by potential plaintiffs who have
also been negligent, thus burdening the court calendar, seem
highly unwarranted.' 36 Proponents of comparative negligence
have tried to assuage such fears by suggesting that presently,
in many areas, personal injury cases are tried by a handful of
specialists, and court calendars must be accommodated to the
schedule of such counsel. The contention is that comparative
negligence will not require such precision in proof and argu-
ment. Thus, more attorneys will handle such cases, since a less
skillful practitioner could emerge scathed yet not completely de-
feated. With comparative negligence, however, it is argued,
will come a reluctance on the part of the plaintiff to settle, since
in most cases he is likely to collect something. Many cases are
prosecuted with the hope that jurors will ignore the strict man-
date of the law and reach a compromise verdict. The compara-
tive negligence proponents point out that settlements are now
prevented where an insurer believes that he has a chance of
completely avoiding payment by proving that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent. In addition, a greater waiver of jury
trials may result if attorneys believe the court would make an
impartial apportionment. Thus, the proponents conclude that
comparative negligence will, in fact, induce early settlement of
the claims and alleviate calendar congestion. In practice,
the change to comparative negligence has not, in fact, resulted
135. Although precise dollar amounts can never be estimated with
precision there would probably be more predictability within certain
ranges as opposed to an all or nothing "guesstimate."
136. See generally Eldredge, Contributory Negligence: An Out-
moded Defense That Should Be Abolished, 43 A.B.A.J. 52, 54 (1957).
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in increased litigation. 3 7
A corollary to the argument that comparative negligence
will result in increased litigation is the fear of skyrocketing in-
surance rates with the ultimate consequences falling on the pub-
lic. This presupposes that the total recovery under comparative
negligence will, by virtue of increased litigation, exceed the total
amounts presently awarded. It is quite probable that the assumed
frequency of plaintiffs' verdicts will be offset by the diminished
amount of the awards. Furthermore, since the expected increase
in litigation has not occurred, the total recovery may, in fact, de-
crease. There has been no change in total recoveries with respect
to federal employers' liability insurance, insuring employers of
longshoremen, or insurance in states which have given up the
doctrine of contributory negligence. 38 In any event, the over-
whelming majority of claims are settled without court inter-
vention and frequently on a less crystalized fault basis.
Contributory negligence was conceived primarily to protect
the growth of essential industries and was weaned on nineteenth
century notions of individualism. 39 This need no longer justi-
fies the retention of that defense as evidenced by its rejection in
Great Britain, the jurisdiction of its inception. 4o Experience
indicates that even under contributory negligence manufacturers
have lost that extra measure of insulation by virtue of the
compromise verdict. If some residuum of need to protect infant
industries remains, it does not appear that one doctrine is more
suited than the other. Comparative negligence will, however,
produce a more just and socially desirable distribution of loss
than that achieved by its outmoded predecessor.' 41
Justice Black has observed that the contributory negli-
gence rule is "a discredited doctrine which automatically de-
stroys all claims of injured persons who have contributed to
their injuries . . .however slight."' 42 There appears to be no
137. INsTnuTE or JuDicTAL ADmIISTniTION or NEW YoRi, COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 13 (1955); Eldredge, supra note 136.
138. INST=TIE OF JUDIciAL ADMINISTRATION OF NEW YoRx, COm-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 13 (1955).
139. Malone, Comparative Negligence--Louisiana's Forgotten Heri-
tage, 6 LA. L. Rnv. 125 (1945).
140. See Law Revision Comm., Contributory Negligence, CMD. 6032
(1939) (led to the 1945 Act); Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13
NACCA L.J. 195 (1954).
141. See generally Bress, Comparative Negligence: Let Us Hearken
To The Call of Progress, 43 A.B.A.J. 127 (1957); Hayes, New York
Should Adopt a Comparative Negligence Rule, 27 N.Y.S.B. BULL. 288
(1955).
142. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953) (dictum).
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legitimate quarrel with this thought. In fact one prominent
scholar, commenting on discussions he had with experts at a
conference of the Committee on Torts of the American Law In-
stitute explains that they "were unanimously opposed to the
rule of contributory negligence as a complete defense, and ...
unanimously favored an apportionment of damages.'
43
Notwithstanding the general preference for comparative neg-
ligence the view persists that abolition of contributory negli-
gence as a complete defense must come from the legislature.
44
This is unfortunate since the doctrine of contributory negligence
is a court-made rule and hence can be modified or repudiated
by any court which is convinced it is unfair 45 Virtually all
American courts have overruled earlier cases involving the anal-
ogous doctrine of imputed contributory negligence.
14 6
If judicial extirpation of contributory negligence is impos-
sible, the legislature is certainly free to substitute comparative
negligence in its stead.' 47 Several courts have attempted to
nudge their legislatures without success.1
48
Comparative negligence statutes are in force in at least six
jurisdictions, 49 and in special circumstances additional states
have repudiated the common law concept in favor of some form
143. Eldredge, supra note 136, at 53.
144. E.g., Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Acci-
dent Litigation, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 476, 483 (1936).
145. See Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 349 Mich. 387, 84 N.W.2d 840
(1957) (searching discussion of contributory negligence in concurring
opinion). See generally Lambert, The Case for Comparative Negligence,
HARv. L. RECORD, Dec. 11, 1958, at 3.
146. Imputed negligence: automobile passenger in close relation to
driver is denied recovery against third party for contributory negligence
of driver. Last clear chance will likely be dealt a similar fate in the
near future. See generally PRossER, TORTS 299-302, 295-96; Lambert,
supra note 145.
147. "The common-law rules respecting ... contributory negligence
... may be altered by state legislation, and even set aside entirely-at
least if some reasonably just substitute is provided." New York Cent.
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 189 (1917) (syllabus); accord, Middleton v.
Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1919).
148. No one can appreciate more than we the hardship of de-
priving plaintiff of his verdict ... but the rule of contributory
negligence, through no fault of ours, remains in our law and
gives us no alternative .... [I]n operation, the rule of com-
parative negligence would serve justice more faithfully....
Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 429-30, 281 N.W. 261,
263 (1938).
149. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730 (1962); GA. CODE AN. § 105-603
(1937); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 1454, 1455 (1942); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-




of apportionment. 15 0 One jurisdiction judicially employs the
novel procedure of applying the contributory negligence rule but
permits the plaintiff to recover if he is only remotely negli-
gent.15' Another approach, sugge:sted above,152 is to use the
terms "gross" and "slight" to indicate the degree of a party's
negligence.
153
Comparative negligence legislation may assume many forms.
The Wisconsin Statute 5 4 is a good illustration of such legisla-
tion:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property,
if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the per-
son against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person recovering.
Thus a plaintiff guilty of forty-nine per cent of the total
negligence may recover fifty-one per cent of his damages. If
his negligence equals or exceeds that of the defendant no re-
covery whatsoever is permitted. 55 Comparative negligence is
150. Heskett v. Pennsylvania Co., 245 F. 326 (6th Cir. 1917) (Ohio
law); Robinet v. Hawk, 200 Cal. 265, 252 P. 1045 (1927); Lassen v.
Southern Pac. Co., 173 Cal. 71, 159 P. 143 (1916); Florida Ry. v. Dorsey,
59 Fla. 260, 52 So. 963 (1910); Tide Water Oil Co. v. American S.S.
Owners Mut. Protection & Indem. Ass'n, 156 Misc. 367, 281 N.Y.S. 729
(1935) (under 45 U.S.C. § 53); Peterson v. Fargo-Moorhead St. Ry.,
37 N.D. 440, 164 N.W. 42 (1917).
151. E.g., McCullough v. Johnson Ereight Lines, 202 Tenn. 596, 308
S.W.2d 387 (1957); McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337, 229 S.W.2d 505
(1950); Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S.W. 869 (1919).
152. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
153. Generally, the more gross the negligence manifested by the
defendant the less care is required by plaintiff to enable him to recover.
E.g., Hickman v. Parks Constr. Co., 162 Neb. 461, 76 N.W.2d 403 (1956)
(under Nebraska statute; see also GA. CODE ANx. §§ 105-603 & 94-703
(1937); S.D. CODE § 47.0304-1 (Supp. I, 1960).
154. Wis. STAT. § 331.045 (1961).
155. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the several
possible configurations of apportioning the damages. One might con-
sider foreclosing recovery if plaintiff is, for example, more than 25%
negligent, or awarding only 2% in the 49-51 example. This latter
method has been used in Nebraska, Grupp & Roper, Comparative
Negligence, 32 NEB. L. REV. 234 (1952), and has been proposed as a revi-
sion of the Wisconsin method. McKirnon, The Case Against Com-
parative Negligence, 28 S.B. CAL. J. 23 (1953). The Nebraska method
might have the advantage of discouraging prospective suitors who will
recover only 2% of their damages.
In Mississippi, unlike Wisconsin where plaintiff is precluded if more
than 49% negligent, a plaintiff found to have been 90% negligent may
nevertheless recover 10% of his total damages. Mss. CODE § 1454 (1942)
provides:
In all actions ... for personal injuries ... death ... [or]
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also workable in the multi-defendant situation. In a case
where plaintiff A sues defendants B, C, and D, and the respec-
tive degrees of negligence were fifteen, fifty, twenty-five, and
ten per cent, the plaintiff may recover against any defendant
whose negligence was greater than his own. 1' 6 The applica-
tion of such an apportionment to multi-party products liability
cases may relieve the pressure to affix blame on the deep pocket
and sharpen focus on the behavior of all the parties. The ex-
ploding soda bottle, manufactured by Coca-Cola, distributed by
a middleman to the supermarket, and juggled by the plaintiff,
illustrates a recurrent multi-party transaction where several
individuals may be blameworthy. The comparative negligence
approach would avoid forcing the entire liability on one party
when several are responsible.
Comparative negligence will encourage consideration of rele-
vant factors by the court and jury and reduce emotionally based
conclusions. By means of special verdicts and interrogatories
157
injury to property, the fact that the person injured . . . may
have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a re-
covery, but damages shall be diminished by the jury in pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
injured....
This formulation is inferior to the Wisconsin statute. Jurors will be
told that plaintiff can maintain his action regardless of his comparative
fault. Jurors may adjust their award upward reasoning that if the law
allows the action, it does not seem fair to award the plaintiff only a
piddling sum. In Mississippi, the plaintiff is not barred even if grossly
negligent. Confusion and injustice are inevitable. Assuming a three car
collision with each driver at fault to the extent of 33% and suffering
$99,000 worth of damages, does the jury follow the letter of the statute
and award each $66,000? To complicate matters Mississippi does not
use the special verdict. This accentuates the obscurity which results
from telling the jury to disregard plaintiff's fault for one purpose, but
precisely apply it for another.
We are told that the biggest lobbyists against comparative negli-
gence are insurance companies who especially criticize the use of this
doctrine without special verdicts. Gilmore, Comparative Negligence
From a Viewpoint of Casualty Insurance, 10 ARx. L. REv. 82 (1955).
This, coupled with clogging the courts with unjustified claims, would
turn a prospective legislator cold. Dissatisfaction with the so-called
"pure form" of comparative negligence which allows recovery even to a
claimant more negligent than the party against whom the claim was
made led to the 1957 re-enactment of the Arkansas comparative negli-
gence statute only two years after it was first passed. These errors
ought to be avoided if comparative negligence is to be successful.
156. Cf. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519,
252 N.W. 721 (1934); Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence,
1941 Wis. L. REv. 289. Several possible configurations are also avail-
able in the multi-defendant situations.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) & (b). Although not necessary for the
success of comparative negligence, the special verdict focuses on the
relevant conduct more distinctly than the general verdict.
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the jury may answer several questions dealing with mutual neg-
ligence. It may indicate what percentage of the total negli-
gence was attributable to each party and the amount of damage
plaintiff sustained. This would facilitate a court's determina-
tion of the bases of apportionment of the negligence, obviate
the former need for intricate instruction, facilitate review on
appeal, and inform the insurance companies how much of the
recovery is attributable to their insured.
Replacing contributory negligence, where it has existed as
a defense, with the curative doctrine of comparative negligence
would no doubt require modification of the principles of last
clear chance, 158 assumption of risk, " and contribution between
tortfeasors. 16 0 Generally speaking, however, the transition could
be effected with relative ease, facilitating the administration of
claims ,#hile ameliorating the harshness of the prior rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear that products liability law would benefit greatly
in fairness and justice if the jury were permitted to consider
fully the buyer's conduct before making an award of consequen-
tial damages based on breach of warranty. This is true even
in jurisdictions which have considered the buyer's conduct in
warranty. In Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Com-
pany,'6 ' the plaintiff had consumed about one-half of a bottle of
Coke when she gagged on what she thought was either loose
tobacco from her cigarette or a small bit of ice. She took an-
other swallow and suffered a cut in her throat from a piece of
glass from the bottle. She was denied recovery on the ground
158. The last clear chance doctrine serves only as a means of es-
cape, by way of comparative fault, from contributory negligence as an
absolute bar and serves no useful purpose in jurisdictions which have
enacted apportionment statutes. Garner, Comparative Negligence and
Discovered Peril, 10 ARK. L. REv. 72 (1955); Johnson, Comparative
Negligence-The Nebraska View, 36 NEB. L. REV. 240 (1957); Maclntyre,
The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARv. L. REy. 1225 (1940);
Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L.J. 195 (1954); Comment,
Effect of a Comparative Negligence Statute on The Humanitarian Doc-
trine, 9 Mo. L. REV. 264 (1944).
159. Whelan, Comparative Negligence, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 465; Note,
Assumption of Risk As a Defense in Nebraska Negligence Actions Under
The Comparative Negligence Statute, 30 NEB. L. REv. 608 (1951).
160. C. GREGORY, LEGIsLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE Ac-
TIONs: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE ASPEcTS OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
AND CONTRIBUTION IN TORT LITIGATION (1936); Whelan, supra note 159;
INSTITUTE or JUDICIAL Amv=smRTio N OF NEW YoRK, ColIARATIVm
NEGLIGENCE (1955).
161. 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (lC63).
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that she assumed the risk. It is certainly not unreasonable to
argue that the jury should have been allowed to apportion dam-
ages based on comparative fault, especially since part of the in-
jury had occurred before the plaintiff "assumed the risk."
'10 2
Many courts have refused to consider the buyer's negli-
gence at all, resulting in cases like Simmons and Kassouf.
These jurisdictions would undoubtedly benefit from the com-
parative negligence approach. The all-or-nothing doctrine of
contributory negligence makes it difficult to take buyer's conduct
into account and still achieve approximate justice. Comparative
negligence, while not a panacea, can serve to substantially amel-
iorate the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine while
balancing the manufacturer's responsibility to society with the
buyer's action in contributing to his injury.
162. See Comment, Products Liability: For the Defense-Contribu-
tory Fault, 33 TENN. L. REV. 464, 484 (1966).
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